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Abstract 
 
Consociationalism has evolved to become the dominant theory for managing political stability 
in heterogeneous states. Consociations fragment power, delineate societies, adopt group-based 
rights and are governed by elites representing different ethnic groups. However, the primordialist 
understanding of identity, institutionalised policies of differential treatment and a number of 
normative failings means consociationalism actually increases the political instability it is 
purported to mitigate.  
 
India, one of the most diverse and complex societies on earth, has adopted several consociational 
mechanisms upon independence. The recently increased consociational nature of India has 
strengthened specific identities and increased intergroup and intragroup antagonisms resulting in 
rising political instability. This is empirically demonstrated by data from India’s National Crime 
Records Bureau. 
 
The 16th Lok Sabha election in 2014 represented a watershed moment for Indian politics and the 
saturation point for consociationalism. A disenchanted electorate turned overwhelmingly to the 
most anti-consociational party in the political system – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The 
party has been the most outspoken critic of consociational policies often describing them as 
‘minorityism’ (Varshney, 1993:252). The BJP, with a platform of development intertwined with 
an Indian identity, transcended the entrenched norms of Indian politics. The rise of the Saffron 
party challenges the theoretical validity and epistemological underpinnings of consociationalism. 
The normative manifestations – coalition governments and affirmative action programmes – 
played a paramount role in the BJP’s ascendency. 
 
The shifting landscape of Indian politics is not limited to the national level. The BJP now controls 
the majority of state governments. In India’s most populous state of Uttar Pradesh, where caste 
mobilisations are especially strong, the BJP gained a landlside victory in the 2017 Vidhan Sabha 
election.  
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Introduction 
 
For political scientists and scholars, India’s continual existence as a functional democracy has 
remained a puzzle. The large-scale population, overall heterogeneity and high degree of 
fragmentation along linguistic, religious, and caste lines, are hypothesised to be problematic for 
political stability (Swenden, 2016a:246).   
 
Approaches to address internal diversity can be separated into two dichotomies occurring on a 
continuum between accommodationist and integrationist policies (McGarry et al., 2008:41-90). 
Integrationists advocate equal citizenship rights, emphasising the commonality and shared 
interests of different ethnic groups, whilst rejecting practices that entrench differentiation such 
as affirmative action and quotas, asymmetric territorial autonomy, and other multicultural 
policies. Conversely, accommodationists recognise ethnic differences and mandate ‘group-
specific rights and policies’ (Swenden, 2016a:248). Consociational theory can be considered the 
epitome of accumulative accommodationist policies. Developed by Arend Lijphart in the 1960s 
to explain stability in Western Europe, it has evolved into a prescriptive set of policy norms 
comprised of four pillars: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and minority 
veto. 
 
The literature review reveals consociational states only appear successful after careful theoretical 
manipulation. Consociationalism is undermined by its conceptions of primordial, static identities 
and homogenous ethnic groups, which institutionalises certain identities, ignoring both the 
variability and multiplicity of identities and pervasiveness of intra-ethnic differences. 
Governance is elitist rather than democratic and the overreliance on negotiations and compromise 
between disparate elites establishes ineffectual policy-making.  The literature review forms the 
theoretical framework and enables the development of a hypothesis: consociational policies 
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cause rising political instability by increasing inter-ethnic antagonisms and establishing 
ineffectual governments. 
 
A review of existing literature concerning Indian consociationalism exposes substantial debate 
over the country’s consociationalism nature although there is general scholarly consensus 
political stability has increased. However, the Indian case has been misunderstood and a more 
nuanced, holistic, and contemporary understanding is required.  
 
The failure to adequately assess the Indian case facilitates the development of the first research 
question - to understand the impact of consociational policies on political instability in India. In 
Chapter Two a historical analysis demonstrates India has maintained several consociational 
elements since independence, which have strengthened since the 1990s. Process-tracing these 
elements exposes their detrimental impact on political stability and social cohesion.  This is 
supported by findings of a quantitative analysis of key political instability indicators - incidences 
of rioting and crimes against SCs - from India’s National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). 
 
Consociationalism relies on the existence of reinforcing cleavages and accordingly policies are 
based on a ‘singular criterion of difference’ (Heyer & Jayal, 2009:7). To apply such policies in 
India, a country with significant ethnic fractionalisation and numerous crosscutting cleavages, 
creates serious challenges. A more appropriate response, accounting for the plurality of Indian 
society, suggests adopting a non-consociational or integrationist approach to managing stability.  
 
The second interrelated research question considers how the recent successes of the BJP can be 
understood as a consequence of consociationalism. Chapter Three first considers the nature of 
the BJP and Hindu nationalism and demonstrates the party is ‘clearly anti-consociational’ 
(Lijphart, 1996:264). Despite many alarmist overtures from political scholars and commentators, 
the BJP has transformed since the early-1990s to become a more moderate party.  
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A backlash against consociational policies allowed the BJP to surpass expectations and win the 
16th Lok Sabha election in 2014 - becoming the first party with a majority since 1984. In the 
following years, the saffron sweep continued with the BJP now controlling 17 states and a further 
five governed by NDA partners. The election represents a critical juncture in Indian politics and 
the failure of consociationalism. 
 
A case study of the 2017 Vidhan Sabha election in Uttar Pradesh in Chapter Four highlights both 
the theoretical and normative failings of consociational theory. Reservations hinge on a 
homogenous understanding of caste-groups, a perception which resulted in the failure to address 
socio-economic imbalances, increased caste antagonisms, and facilitated caste-based parties - 
BSP and SP - to dominate state politics. Analysis of jati-level voting behaviour highlights the 
fluidity of identity and importantly demonstrates the successful exploitation by the BJP of jati 
untouched by reservations. 
 
The thesis contributes to the literature concerning consociational theory by demonstrating 
consociational policies in the world’s largest democracy have increased rather than decreased 
political instability. It provides a nuanced, contemporary account of consociationalism in India - 
an area devoid of recent academic attention. The scope of instability is broadened to include 
levels of rioting and caste conflict, whereas most scholars focus on levels of Hindu-Muslim 
violence. It also furthers understanding of the recent and unprecedented saffron sweep by the 
BJP, presenting the rise of the party as both a consequence of the failure of consociational policies 
and BJP’s ability to exploit these failings.  
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Methodology 
 
Researching the relationship between consociationalism and political instability and 
understanding the rise of the BJP requires several different approaches. A literature review of 
consociational theory and its critiques enables the development of a hypothesis. A historical 
analysis of consociational policies in India combined with a quantitative analysis of political 
instability indicators demonstrates their interrelationship. A qualitative assessment of the BJP 
exposes its anti-consociational nature and facilitates a quantitative analysis of the 16th Lok Sabha 
election. A case study of Uttar Pradesh further legitimises the arguments in the preceding 
chapters and allows for a deeper analysis. 
 
Theory  
Consociationalism is classified as a typological theory as it delineates independent variables (the 
four pillars) into categories that can then be analysed individually, allowing for contingent or 
conditional generalisations on their joint configuration to affect a specified dependent variable 
(political stability) (George & Bennett, 2004:857).  
 
The thesis adopts a critical rationalist approach, which conceives social science progress through 
the reduction in unwarranted beliefs and the falsification of theories and hypotheses (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012:10). Critical rationalists use deductive research to explore a theory, develop a 
new hypothesis and test its validity in a specific circumstance. Testing of typological theories 
requires process-tracing, an analysis of the causal mechanisms that transmit forces from X to Y, 
linking causes and outcome (Van Evera, 1997:64).  
 
 
Case Studies  
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Case studies are a proven method to construct, refine, and falsify typological theories and a 
mechanism to trace causal-processes (George & Bennett, 2004:861) Application of a theory in a 
specific context allows the effects of both agents and social structures to be considered in a single 
framework whilst accounting for diverse discourses and material factors (George & Bennett, 
2004:861). The use of detailed and specific evidence facilitates greater consideration between 
‘empirical evidence and abstract’ (Blatter & Haverland, 2012:13) and ensures conclusions are 
robust and not based on reductionist conceptions.  
 
It is impossible to analyse Indian politics without case studies of Indian states. Reading policies 
and actions by the Centre masks many changes occurring sub-nationally. Indian states are ‘the 
effective arena of political choice’ (Palshikar & Yadav, 2009:56), where social cleavages and 
identities of caste, language, and religion are fostered and mobilised (Manor, 1998:22) and have 
the primary responsibility for many consociational policies. A case study of Uttar Pradesh needs 
little justification. UP is considered the cradle of India’s liberation movement, the centre of 
Muslim politics and crucible of reservation politics (Kudaisya, 2002:155). The state weighs 
heavy on national politics; its demographic strength justifiably means it plays a significant role 
in political life. It is the epicentre of identity politics and its caste-religious mobilisations often 
affect the national body politic (Hassan, 2017).  
 
Jati  
The caste system is not a simple hierarchical division of castes or varnas. Hindu India is 
comprised of over 3000 subcastes or jati that range in size from a few hundred to millions of 
people. Unlike the universalisms of varna, jati are geographically and linguistically bound (Dutt, 
1998:423). The categorisation of India’s population into broad social groups - SCs, STs and 
OBCs - is inadequate in understanding political mobilisation (Trivedi et al., 2017:125). Recent 
analysis (Huber & Suryanarayan (2014), Thachil & Teitelbaum, (2015)) validates jati as the most 
appropriate dimension for demonstrating the variation in voting patterns. Jati can be considered 
the narrowest segmental identity available for political mobilisation, thus exposing the most 
nuanced variations in support for political parties. 
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Ethnicity  
The complexity of Indian society ‘makes it  harder and more risky to apply [the term ethnicity] 
in India than almost anywhere else in the world’ (Manor, 1996:463) and traditionally scholars 
avoided it. However, recently a broader definition of ethnicity has been mainstreamed in political 
science and Indian politics. The thesis adopts Chandra’s (2005:358) definition which focuses on 
descent-based attributes meaning ‘nominal membership in an ascriptive category, including race, 
language, caste, or religion’. The definition therefore allows jati to be considered an ethnic 
identity. 
 
Measuring Political Stability 
Political instability is comprised of two related components:  
(1) Governmental instability relating the fragility and effectiveness of government as well 
its propensity for change and levels of corruption. 
(2) Non-governmental components concerning broader factors, such as public 
demonstrations and ethnic violence (Dowding & Kimber, 1983:229-243).  
The definition facilitates a quantitative measurement of non-governmental components using key 
political instability indicators and qualitative analysis of governmental instability. 
 
Data 
To empirically demonstrate the relationship between consociationalism and political instability, 
a framework extending beyond Hindu-Muslim violence is required.  Incidences of rioting and 
crimes committed against SCs have been compiled from India’s National Crime Records Bureau 
(NCRB) annual Crime in India reports (1953–2016). Since 1974 crimes against SCs have been 
recorded, first by the Committee on the Welfare of the SCs and STs and then by the NCRB. 
Crimes against SCs (committed by non-SCs/STs) are recorded under the Indian Penal Code and 
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Special and Local Laws1. 
 
The NCRB, with the exception of SCs and STs, does not record other ‘ethnically’ motivated 
crimes independently but rather under the broad categorisations of the Indian Penal Code 
(Murder, Dacoity etc.). Therefore the use of riot data is justified as an effective measurement of 
political instability by incorporating antagonisms and discontentment outside of caste-religious 
confines. Indian criminal law defines a riot as ‘an assembly of five or more persons engaged in 
unlawful activities directed against government institutions, the laws, persons, or property, for 
the purpose of committing mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence’ (Brass, 2005:66). 
However, the NCRB relies on reporting from local police stations, which exhibit spatial and 
temporal variations in recording crimes and a predisposition to underreport certain incidents. 
Furthermore riot numbers do not reflect the number of deaths or duration. Although the datasets 
are imperfect, they provide an effective insight into overall trends of political instability.  
 
Data concerning the social profiles of political parties support bases has been compiled from the 
Centre of the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS). Field investigators collect data from face-
to-face interviews to comprehend political attitudes before and after elections. All CSDS data 
cited is publically available except the 2017 ‘U.P. post-poll survey’ providing jati-level voting 
behaviour (permission has been granted for the results to be reproduced).  
 
All data concerning national and state elections has been accessed directly from the Electoral 
Commission of India (ECI).  
																																																								
1 Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. SCs and STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 
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Literature Review 
Consociational Theory 
 
Consociationalism was first developed by Arend Lijphart in the 1960s, progressing from ‘a 
description of conflict resolution in Western Europe’ (Wilkinson, 2000:767) to the dominant 
theory for managing stability in heterogeneous states throughout the world. Lijphart's 
contribution has been so influential that the theory is often equated with his work.  
 
A consociational state is consists of four pillars (Lijphart, 1977:25): 
 (1) A government through a grand coalition where political elites representing all significant 
ethnic groups govern collectively. 
(2) Segmental or cultural autonomy where decision-making is delegated to the relevant ethnic 
groups of the state, taking the form of territorial and non-territorial federalism. 
(3) A minority veto over important legislation that offers minority groups a guarantee they will 
not be out-voted by the majority when their vital interests are at stake. This can be through 
de jure mechanisms or de facto when coalitions are dependent on minority parties. 
(4) Proportionality, which is the basic consociational standard of representation, extending 
beyond electoral systems to include education, the allocation of funds, and public sector 
employment.   
 
The fundamental aim ‘is to share, diffuse, separate, divide, decentralise, and limit power’ 
(Lijphart, 1984:168).  Consociational scholars argue that the fragmentation of politics encourages 
elites to create coalitions across ethnic lines to form governments. Political elites use electoral 
leverage to secure power in the executive and make political gains for their community 
(Choudhry, 2008:19).  The aim ‘is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize 
them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy’ 
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(Lijphart, 1977:42).  
  
The Failings of Consociational Theory  
Proponents have continued to refine and adapt consociationalism, extending the theory beyond 
its original scope. Although Lijphart (2008:4) states that definitions have remained stable since 
1996, with his analysis of India representing the ‘final formulation of consociational theory’, 
much ambiguity remains with no clearly defined manifestations of the four pillars.  The fact 
consociational theory is a ‘moving target’ has proved a useful tool in academic debates, which 
overtly focus on specific case studies. The ambiguity allows for theoretical manipulation in 
specific contexts to cause the broader concept to appear successful. However the general theory 
with defined norms does not stand up to scrutiny. Empirical studies have failed to address the 
conceptual whole by reducing consociationalism to federalism and proportional electoral 
systems.  
 
 Identity 
Democratic states remain stable through the pluralist theory of crosscutting cleavages, which 
rests on two assumptions: opposition parties and minority groups will eventually share power 
because of the changing nature of political coalitions around different issues and the attenuating 
effects of citizens’ competing identities. For example, the identity of a Tamil speaker crosscuts 
caste and religion. However, Choudhry (2008:17), in congruence with consociationalist scholars, 
argues that in heterogeneous states the assumptions do not prevail, unlike the moderating effects 
of crosscutting cleavages, reinforcing cleavages cause immoderation. Political divisions and 
mobilisations are formed around the different ethnic groups with minorities continually locked 
out of power (Lijphart, 1977:72).  
 
Consociationalists ignore the existence of crosscutting identities or their ability to develop, 
believing opponents ‘seriously underestimate the strength and persistence of segmental 
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divisions’ (Lijphart, 1985:108). This overestimates the ‘degree of segmentation among ethnic 
and communal groups’ and fails to consider segmental groups as heterogeneous entities that can 
be divided internally to ‘undermine segmental cleavages and permit inter-segmental alliances’ 
(Brass, 1991:338-340).  Furthermore, recognising ethnic groups as homogenous units neglects 
intragroup socioeconomic differences, which in many circumstances are greater and therefore 
mitigate intergroup difference. 
 
In Ethnic Conflict in Multiethnic Societies Brass (1991:333) dedicates a chapter to 
consociationalism, highlighting the shared set of assumptions among consociationalist scholars. 
Identity and cleavages are conceived as primordial and static, for example McGarry et al. 
(2008:53) argue ‘ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups have existed since time immemorial and 
will remain a permanent fixture of politics […] national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions 
and identities are resilient, durable, and hard’. Consociationalists’ ‘segregation-oriented 
theoretical disposition’ (Dixon, 2011:310), derives from the erroneous assumptions political 
mobilisation along segmental lines is inevitable and ‘there is a fixed number of ethnic groups 
that can each be satisfied with a portion of political power and state resources’ (Wilkinson, 
2000:787). 
 
Plides (2008:177) successfully demonstrates the magnitude of empirical and theoretical research 
which ‘consistently reveals a dynamic process behind the formation, maintenance, and 
diminishment’ of identity. Brass and Plides adopt an instrumentalist and social constructivist 
approach to identity, recognising variability and fluidity and the fact citizens have a multi-faceted 
- as opposed to a singular - identity. As Dixon (2011:210) identifies, prioritising certain identities 
‘reinforces precisely those antagonistic communal identities that policy makers are supposed to 
be managing into less antagonistic forms’. The failure of consociationalists to acknowledge the 
dynamism of identity exposes a significant theoretical flaw. 
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 Role of Elites  
Consociationalism does not just reject the role elites play in shaping and mobilising different 
identities but actually incentivises elites to maintain divisions to ensure they are a partner in the 
system (Brass, 1991:338). Political power is an effective vehicle for distributing resources 
through patronage, redistributive policies, government employment, or other measures. When 
resources are distributed unevenly, elites from disadvantaged ethnic groups mobilise members 
by ‘intensifying and multiplying’ differences from more advantaged groups (Brass, 1991:33). In 
the absence of ‘objective bases for mobilization’ elites establish the perception of disadvantage 
and discrimination ‘by magnifying minor cases’ (Brass, 1991:293).  By promoting reinforcing 
cleavages, utilising symbols and other devices, elites construct the idea of their group being 
distinct. Identities mobilised by elites for political purposes ‘radiate into other arenas, including 
more general cultural and social understandings’ (Plides, 2008:178). To demonstrate the role that 
political parties play, Brass (1991:49) uses the example of the Akali Dal that not only identified 
itself with the Sikh community but also shaped what it means to be a Sikh.  
 
Consociationalists embrace their system as elitist, justified because other systems are considered 
equally elitist (Lijphart, 1985:110). They believe the option for heterogeneous states is not 
between consociational or adversarial democracies but between the consociational model and no 
democracy at all (Lijphart, 1977:238). As consensus cannot be achieved, elites are expected to 
act with moderation, negotiate the politics of compromise, and impose decisions agreed. The 
process ‘entails a strengthening of the political inertness of the non-elite public and of their 
deferential attitudes towards segmental leaders’ (Lijphart, 1997:169). The reliance on elite 
governance raises serious questions about the quality of democracy that consociationalism 
allows, whilst making dangerous assumptions about the deference of the wider population. 
 
Grand Coalitions & Proportionality 
Although Horowitz, like Lijphart, is from the accommodationist school of thought, he remains 
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deeply critical of consociationalism. Consociational democracies, according to Horowitz, are 
absent of competition for the median voter. Individuals vote for their own societal group, 
meaning elections are not democratic but an ‘ethnic census’ (Horowitz, 1985:53). Horowitz 
(2002a:17) argues consociationalism is ‘motivationally inadequate’, failing to provide a coherent 
argument as to why segmental elites are incentivised to cooperate in a grand coalition, and 
overestimates the power elites have over the societal segments they represent. Elites have 
frequently been subjected to a backlash from their community, who view compromises as an act 
of betrayal. The result is a loss of support for moderate and ‘outbidding’ where more extreme 
and uncompromising candidates win elections (Chandra, 2005: 236). Instead of competition for 
the moderate centre, there is competition on the extremes (Choudhry, 2008:17).  
 
Grand coalitions must be composed of all ‘major’ societal segments. Leaving aside the ambiguity 
of what constitutes ‘major’, coalitions comprised of internally cohesive parties with vast 
ideological differences creates a high number of veto players, limits areas of consensus and 
makes ‘significant departures from the status quo impossible’ (Tsebelis, 2002:2). Simple 
electoral arithmetic establishes a de facto minority veto over all government policy, as the 
removal of support causes governments to collapse. Therefore grand coalitions and the inherent 
minority veto produce political instability and ineffectual decision-making.  
 
The concept of proportionality, particularly in public sector employment, fosters resentment from 
ethnic segments not privileged by quota systems. Groups demand greater allocations for their 
community or to be recognised as ‘a separate ethnic group and to become an equal partner in the 
consociational system’ (Weiner, 1978:216). Failing to consider intragroup difference allows the 
upper echelons of segmental groups to benefit from institutionalised quotas, whilst those at the 
bottom remain excluded. Thus proportionality creates both intergroup and intragroup tension and 
conflict (Brass, 1991:333). Similarly non-territorial autonomy creates antagonisms between 
ethnic groups through policies of differential treatment and perceived discrimination (McGarry 
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et al., 2008:72).  
 
Conclusion  
The successes of consociational states are almost non-existent. The breakdown of consociational 
systems in Cyprus and Lebanon, the disintegration of former communist federations in Eastern 
and Central Europe and the transition away from consociational democracies by Western 
European states demonstrates consociational theory does not guarantee political stability 
(McGarry et al., 2008:102).  
 
Consociationalism freezes existing identities and cleavages that reflect ‘the circumstances at the 
moment of formation’ (Plides, 2008:185). The theoretical framework adopts an elitist, 
primordialist, and reductionist approach that rests on the politics of segregation or ‘voluntarily 
apartheid’ (Lijphart, 1969:219). It violates the rights of individuals and groups not reorganised 
in the consociational system (Brass, 1991:342). Consociational theory fails to recognise the 
multiplicity and dynamism of identities, intra-segmental group differences and pervasiveness of 
crosscutting cleavages. Consolations reify certain identities above others, overestimate the ability 
of elites to gain the support of their community for compromises agreed, creates deficiencies of 
grand coalitions, and antagonism associated with preferential treatment. Thus consociationalism 
does not mitigate, but furthers political instability.  
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Indian Consociationalism 
 
The extent to which India has conformed to consociational theory throughout its history has been 
highly debated, predominately between Lijphart, Wilkinson, and Brass. All three concede that 
India has adopted some consociational elements but maintain substantial differences over their 
nature, longevity, and effect. In addition, many scholars have analysed different components of 
the four pillars but have not explicitly considered the consociational framework.  Although 
disagreement over India’s consociational nature exists, there is scholarly consensus that political 
instability has increased.   
 
India has traditionally been considered the major anomalous case for consociationalism. 
However, Lijphart’s (1996:258) The Puzzle of Indian Democracy controversially stated: ‘India 
is not a deviant […] but, instead, an impressive confirming case’.  This was in response to Brass’ 
(1991:342) claim: ‘consociationalists […] consistently ignore the experience of India, the largest, 
most culturally diverse society in the world that has functioned with a highly competitive and 
distinctly adversarial system of politics’. Lijphart (1996:258-259) argues India was a ‘perfectly 
and thoroughly consociational system […] displaying all four crucial elements’ for the first two 
decades of independence and attributes increased intergroup tensions and communal violence to 
the weakening of consociationalism after the late-1960s.  
 
However, Lijphart’s conclusions rely on reading central government policies and the Indian 
constitution. This neglects state-level analysis and fails to acknowledge the gulf between policy 
and outcome. As Manor (1996:474) highlights, ‘political action has always been more important 
than political rhetoric in determining outcomes in India’. Lijphart’s arguments are further 
weakened by an overreliance on anecdotal or singular examples. The 1965 agreement that Hindi 
would not become the sole national language with opposition from the Dravidian-speaking states 
is insufficient in demonstrating evidence of a wider minority veto, whereas there have been 
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countless examples of linguistic legislation enacted against the expressed wishes of the minority 
community affected (Wilkinson, 2004:110-136). 
 
Over a decade later, Lijphart’s article was republished in Thinking about Democracy: Power 
Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. Although the preamble acknowledges the 
decline of Congress and shift to a multiparty system created ‘very broad coalition cabinets often 
including more than a dozen parties’ (Lijphart, 2008:5) thus strengthening consociationalism, the 
subject is not discussed further and his assessment from 1996 remains unchanged. 
 
Lijphart (1996:226) alleges India provides a ‘theoretically coherent’ explanation and at times his 
analysis maintains theoretical congruence with earlier work; for example, by maintaining an 
elitist position by attributing the decline of consociationalism to ‘greater mass mobilization and 
activation’. However acknowledging ‘socioeconomic differences within religious and linguistic 
groups are so much larger that they overshadow intergroup disparities’ and ‘overarching loyalties 
reduce the strength of particularistic loyalties’ (Lijphart, 1996:263), undermines contrary 
assertions in previous work. 
 
In India, Consociational Theory, and Ethnic Violence and Votes and Violence: Electoral 
Competition and Ethnic Violence in India Wilkinson (2000:767) is critical of the consociational 
model and ‘reassesses the value of consociational power sharing as a method for reducing ethnic 
violence’. Wilkinson (2000:770) takes the opposite view to Lijphart, arguing India was a non-
consociational state under Nehru as ‘minority opinion was frequently overruled by the majority’, 
lower castes, religious and linguistic minorities were excluded from government jobs and 
political power and the poor enforcement of reservation quotas for SCs and STs. However this 
overlooks many institutionalised consociational elements that India adopted upon independence: 
linguistic reorganisation, constitutionally guaranteed educational autonomy, and separate 
personal laws for different religions. For Wilkinson, Indian consociationalism increased after 
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Nehru as reservations were expanded and enforced more effectively and the rise of caste-based 
parties more closely aligns to the consociational model. Both Lijphart (1996:265) and Wilkinson 
(2004:99) are in agreement that this period in India’s political history is characterised by rising 
Hindu-Muslim violence.   
 
Although Wilkinson (2000:787) demonstrates ‘consociational policies in India have not 
historically been associated with lower levels of ethnic violence’, the argument focuses on 
consociational policies not mitigating instability rather than those policies being the source of 
instability. The absence of process-tracing to demonstrate the correlation with rising instability 
forces Wilkinson (2000:787) to conclude ‘it is possible that the historical association between 
consociational policies and ethnic violence in India is simply a coincidence’.  
 
Brass (1991:343) adopts a more nuanced view; although believing India to be thoroughly non-
consociational recognises ‘it has adopted many consociational devices, some permanently, some 
temporarily’.  For Brass (1991:334) the ‘successes and failures in resolving ethnic conflicts do 
not support the assumptions of consociationalists […] or the solutions offered by the 
consociational model’, believing the model inapplicable because India has operated a system of 
both ‘interethnic aggregative parties’ and ‘ethnically exclusive or primarily monoethnic parties’. 
By assuming that grand coalitions must be comprised of ‘monoethnic’ parties, he overlooks its 
varying manifestations and the diversity of the Congress System. Brass primarily engages the 
theoretical critiques of consociationalism in abstract form. His approach is too reductionist, 
overtly focusing on political parties and grand coalitions during Indira Gandhi’s tenure as Prime 
Minister, whilst neglecting the three other pillars.   
 
The Indian consociational debate pays little attention to the crosscutting nature of caste, language 
and religious cleavages. Contrastingly, Manor (1996:459-475) demonstrates that the complex 
cleavage structure prevents conflict ‘building up along a single fault-line’. Caste cleavages 
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prevent the consolidation of single Hindu majority and diminish the likeness of communal 
violence whilst ‘regional divisions undermine interregional alliances on religious and class lines. 
Caste, class, and religious conflicts damage regional solidarity. Urban-rural rivalry weighs 
against most other types of conflict’ (Manor, 1996:459-475).  
 
Commenting on the variability of Indian identities, Manor (1996:459) stated ‘citizens shift their 
preoccupations from subregional to national and then to regional identities, passionately, but with 
great speed and fluidity’. Like Weiner, Manor (1996:464) uses the case study of Telengana to 
strengthen his argument. In 1971, through alleged discrimination by the state government, the 
subregional Telengana identity was mobilised, and consequently the Telengana Praja Samithi 
(TPS) won 10 of the 11 seats in the region. Following an elite compromise the TPS merged with 
Congress and focus shifted to the national level with caste and class identities playing a 
significant role in the 1977 and 1983 elections. However by 1983 the state identity was decisive, 
with people ‘protesting about affronts to the dignity of the entire state’ and the Telugu Desam 
Party (TDP) won Andhra Pradesh.  Therefore implications for applying consociational policies 
based on reinforcing cleavages and a singular, fixed ethnic criterion of difference are increased 
political instability. 
 
Previous academic work has largely misunderstood the Indian case by failing to adopt a holistic 
approach accounting for both theoretical underpinnings and normative manifestations. Academic 
analysis is out-dated, largely occurring in the 1990s and thus does not consider recent trends in 
contemporary Indian politics: regionalisation, political fragmentation, coalition governments, 
and OBC reservations and their relationship with consociationalism. There is also an absence of 
process-tracing consociational policies to understand their negative consequences. Lijphart and 
Wilkinson's arguments focus on Hindu-Muslim violence, whereas consociational systems 
concern an array of non-religious ethnic groups.  
  
	23 
Consociationalism & Political Instability 
  
India has displayed several consociational elements since independence that have increased over 
time due to the introduction of reservations for OBCs and the regionalisation of Indian politics 
necessitating coalitions at the Centre. This chapter conducts a historical analysis of 
consociational policies in India supported by previous academic work, with emphasis from the 
early-1990s onwards. This allows for causal process-tracing of consociational elements to 
demonstrate their detrimental effect on political stability. The latter section analyses empirical 
evidence of rioting and crimes against SCs to provide quantitative validation. 
 
Table 4.1 Three interpretations of Indian Consociationalism  
 
The Nehruvian Era (1947-1964)  
 Grand Coalition  
The term Congress System is used to describe the unique style of governance that previously 
existed in India. The INC, which governed India uninterrupted until 1977, encompassed ‘all the 
major sections and interests of society’ (Kothari, 1989:22). As the ‘party of consensus’ at the 
political centre, Congress was surrounded on both sides by minor parties or ‘parties of pressure’, 
preventing it from straying too far from the ‘the balance of effective public opinion’ (Kothari, 
1989:22-27). Congress was a ‘vertically integrated federal party’ dependent on local elites, vote-
banks and a patronage system in rural areas (Kothari, 1964:1163).  The Congress System largely 
conforms to the concept of a grand coalition, with disparate elites ‘reconciling their difference 
through bargaining amongst themselves’ (Lijphart, 1996:260). The system flourished before 
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mass political mobilisation and the ‘first democratic upsurge’ (Verma, 2016:44) in the 1960s as 
elites were better positioned to impose policy decisions on a deferential electorate. The elitism 
in Congress explains Lijphart’s identification of the system as consociationalism 
 
Segmental Autonomy  
Three elements of segmental autonomy in India can be identified: linguistic, educational, and 
religious. Following tension and violence in Andhra, in 1955 the States Reorganisation 
Commission (SRC) recommended state reorganisation along linguistic boundaries. Lijphart 
(1996:260) and Kothari (1970:115) consider linguistic federalism ‘a cementing and integrating 
influence’ rather than a ‘force for division’. However language politics have produced more 
street violence in the twenty years after partition than religious violence (Desai, 2000:93) and 
‘threatened to push newly independent India to the brink of instability’ (Kudaisya, 2002:163). 
The failure to designate a singular national language, or more significantly specify official state 
languages in perpetuity allowed languages to be conceived as open and amendable. Linguistic 
groups are incentivised to demand their language be upgraded to an official language or the 
language of another group be downgraded, establishing linguistic mobilisation as a recurring 
issue (Chandra, 2000: 235-252). 
 
Linguistic federalism allowed minorities to become majorities at state level and allowed 
dominant language groups to discriminate against minority languages. There was a concerted 
effort by states to underreport levels of linguistic minorities and a refusal to offer government 
publications, civil service examinations, or educational facilities in minority languages 
(Wilkinson, 2004:116). For example, the UP State Government stated it was ‘not inclined to 
provide secondary education through the mother tongue of linguistic minorities’ whilst the Tamil 
Nadu government continually refused to supply Hindi language education (Wilkinson, 
2004:116). 
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Figure 4.1 Linguistic Reorganisation (1953-1966) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
The Indian Constitution (Article 30) grants religious and linguistic minorities the right to 
establish and administer educational institutions. Article 44 is anti-consociational in mandating 
‘the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code’. However it has not 
been implemented and a system of separate personal laws is in place that governs family matters 
for different religions (e.g., Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937). 
 
Proportionality 
The Constitution (Article 15(4)) states ‘nothing shall prevent the State from making any special 
provision for the advancement’ of backward classes, SCs, and STs. The latter two groups were 
granted proportionality in education and public employment, and reserved constituencies in 
national, state, and local legislatures (Chandra, 2000:235-252). The policy was envisaged to last 
a decade but successive amendments to the Constitution enabled its continuity. However, a vast 
gulf between policy and implementation existed. SCs and STs collectively represented 22.5% of 
India’s population, but in 1964 occupied 4.53% of Class I and II jobs (Table 4.3). The 
demonstration of failing to fill reserved jobs is symptomatic of how consociational policies are 
often poorly implemented. 
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Many constituencies reserved for SCs are in areas with substantial Muslim populations (often 
over 50%)2, meaning they are excluded from contesting elections. The Sachar Commission 
Report (2006:25) stated the SC reserved seats  ‘reduces the opportunities that Muslims have to 
get elected to democratic institutions’. Thus accommodating one minority has been at the 
expense of another.  
 
Minority Veto 
There is little evidence to suggest minority groups had the ability to veto legislation affecting 
their communities. Job reservations and guaranteed political representation for religious 
minorities were abolished upon independence. There are also many incidences of majoritarian 
impulses; 14 states enacted legislation banning cow slaughter that disproportionately affected 
religious minorities, and in UP, Hindi was designated the sole official language (at the expensive 
of Urdu) despite opposition from the Muslim community3 (Wilkinson, 2004:119).  
 
During the Nehruvian era, India was neither wholly consociational nor non-consociational, 
having a grand coalition, segmental autonomy and proportionality for SCs but denying many 
groups proportionality and no minority veto. It is clear the consociational policies have been 
discriminatory and detrimental to political stability.  
 
 
Increasing Consociationalism (1964-1989) 
The ascension of Mrs Gandhi to Prime Minister marks the beginning of the decline of the 
Congress System. The INC was made ‘utterly dependent on her, suspending intraparty 
democracy and debate, and weakening the organisation’ (Varshney, 1993:243). Similarly, the 
Indian state was centralised through the increased use of the President's Rule, allowing the Centre 																																																								
2 Sachar Commission Report (2006), appendix 2.2 
3 Vote passed 105 to 23, only members of the Muslim league voted against.  
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to remove democratically elected state governments and impose direct rule. Furthermore, The 
Emergency (1975-1977) was one of the most controversial periods of Indian politics. Mrs Gandhi 
was empowered to rule by decree, national and state elections were postponed, political 
opponents arrested, civil liberties curtailed, and a number political parties and other organisations 
outlawed. With a two-thirds parliamentary majority, the ruling Congress was empowered to 
unilaterally pass laws and change the Constitution. Clearly, the centralisation tendencies of Indira 
Gandhi were not just anti-consociational but anti-democratic. 
 
Table 4.2: Incidents of Presidents Rule (1950-2015) 
 
Source: Swenden (2016b:500). 
 
The anti-consociational centralisation was offset by other changes. The 1971 decision to bifurcate 
state and national elections created a strong regionalising effect generating a fertile environment 
for the rise of regional parties. States became the effective arena of political choice with increased 
autonomy and assertion (Brass, 1991:122-133). Reservations were also better enforced thus 
increasing proportionality for SCs and STs.  
 
The landmark Shao Bano case cemented separate personal laws and furthered the minority veto. 
Shah Bano, a Muslim divorcee sought financial support from her husband, which is not mandated 
by Islamic law. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Bano, referencing Article 44 of the 
Constitution, arguing in an anti-consociational manner ‘a common civil code will help the cause 
of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies’ 
(Khan v Bano, 1985:32). However, in accordance with consociational theory, Congress reversed 
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the decision following a backlash from the Muslim community, which considered the ruling as a 
violation of their personal laws.  
 
Table 4.3: Percentage (%) of SC & ST Representation in Central Government 
Employment 
 
Source: Wilkinson (2004:113).  
 
Most Consociational  
The increase in India’s consociational nature from the early-1990s can be attributed to two 
interrelated factors: the fragmentation of the political system facilitated the rise of state parties 
which in turn cemented ‘grand coalitions’, UPA and NDA governments, at the Centre. The 
Mandal Commission increased proportionality by extending reservations to OBCs. During this 
period, the criticisms of consociationalism became more pronounced.  
 
Mandal Commission 
In 1991, the JD government implemented the recommendations of the Mandal Commission that 
mandated the ‘backwardness of OBCs justified reservations of 27% in the bureaucracy and the 
public sector’ (Jaffrelot, 2000:94). Jati are classified as OBC according to social, educational, 
and economic criteria. Although OBC reservations were agreed upon between many upper-caste 
elites, the implementation ‘precipitated riots and concomitant deaths throughout India’ as many 
upper-caste Hindus believed they were being unfairly treated (Fickett, 1993:1151). This 
demonstrates the way in which consociationalism overestimates the support elites will receive 
from their communities for their negotiated compromises, without offering any explanation of 
how to go about this. 
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The OBC category is too heterogeneous; with 256 jati listed as OBC in Maharashtra alone. In 
congruence with the consociational conception of homogenous ethnic groups, reservations 
consider ‘backwardness an attribute not of individuals but of communities’ (Beteille, 1981:8). 
Overlooking inter-jati differences within the OBC category created the well-documented 
‘creamy-layer’, where more socio-economically advanced jati dominate reservations, receiving 
a disproportional share of the benefits (Jaffrelot, 2000:100).  
 
Following Mandal, caste-based mobilisations and antagonisms flourished. New parties were 
formed, not just representing specific caste identities but playing a crucial role in shaping them 
(Chandra, 2004:47). A number of states suffered from a high degree of political fragmentation, 
allowing caste-based parties to make narrow social appeals (Chibber & Nooruddin, 2004:152). 
The strong link, between caste or jati and party caused political and social identities to become 
blurred, with BSP as ‘the Dalit party’ and the SP the ‘party of Yadavs’ (Heath, 2014:746-757).   
 
Initially, OBC identities became reinforced and more unified, but soon fractured to protect their 
interests as reservations created institutional encouragement of the polarisation and strengthening 
of jati identity (Verma, 2004:5463). As separate state and national lists of OBCs exist, with both 
subject to revision, jati across India agitate to be listed as OBC with regular mass violence or the 
prospect of violence erupting (Kumar, 2016:10). Reservations contributed to the fractionalisation 
in the Indian political system, incentivising identity politics and the salience of caste. 
 
Coalition Governments 
The already crumbling Congress system fully disintegrated, ushering in an era of coalition 
politics based on a multi-party, regionalised system. Although the last majority government was 
in 1984, the breakthrough came in 1996 when the United Front, a coalition of 13 parties, formed 
a government. Regionalisation increased the multi-centric nature of Indian politics and created 
an upsurge of regional identities, necessitating alliances between national and state parties at the 
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Centre (Kothari, 1989:13). 
 
Figure 4.2: Percentage (%) of Seats Held by State Parties in the Lok Sabha, 1989-2014 
 
Source: ECI (1989-2014) 
 
The inherent problems are summarised by Brass (2010:98) and demonstrated by the UPA 
government under Manmohan Singh and NDA administration headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. 
: 
 ‘State parties treated the allocated ministries as virtual fiefdoms and used them 
as patronage to the advantage of their parties. Cabinet cohesion and collective 
responsibility are stretched and diversified beyond constitutionally recognised 
limits to extra-parliamentary centres of powers’ 
 
The UPA government was subjected to a well-documented ‘policy paralysis’. Whilst India was 
facing a fiscal deficit with high inflation and interest rates, the government was unable to take 
decisive action. Manmohan Singh acknowledged the ‘lack of political consensus on many issues 
was impeding rapid economic growth’ (Thakurta & Raghuraman, 2008:80). The differences 
between the composite members of the UPA were acted out in the public arena, promoting the 
image of disunited government strife. Likewise, the NDA government was subject to confusion 
over the direction of economic policies because of ‘deep-rooted ideological differences’ 
(Thakurta & Raghuraman, 2008:85). 
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Coalition politics reduced the powers of the Prime Minister and cabinet positions had to be given 
to coalition partners that were then utilised for partisan and state purposes instead of pan-Indian, 
inclusive policies. As their support was necessary for government survival, they were protected 
from dismissal. Such invincibility increased corruption and fraudulent schemes. The UPA was 
plagued by high-profile cases including the ‘Coalgate scam’ and the ‘2G spectrum scam’ 
(Chhibber & Verma, 2014:44). The latter, one of the biggest in India, resulted in an estimated 
loss of ₹1760 billion and the imprisonment of Telecommunications Minister and DMK politician 
Andimuthu Raja (Times of India, 2010). 
 
The NDA administration, which failed to secure a parliamentary majority, was able to form a 
government as several parties abstained in the vote confidence (Thakurta & Raghuraman, 
2008:427). This precarious position allowed a block of 27 MPs from Tamil Nadu led by the 
AIADMK to exert considerable influence, demanding several ministerial portfolios and 
politically expedient bureaucratic transfers and postings (Sharma, 2015:21). When the BJP 
refused to concede any further, the AIADMK withdrew its support, a critical factor in the 
government losing a vote of confidence by one vote 18 months after formation (Times of India, 
2008).  Coalitions, rather than granting minorities a veto over policies concerning their vital 
interests, establish a de facto veto over all government policy. 
 
The political realisation of a grand coalition has been an unsuccessful exercise in the Indian 
political arena, creating political instability through policy paralysis and ineffectual governance 
with corruption and patronage politics flourishing. The UPA and NDA, comprised of disparate 
parties representing different social groups, are a closer realisation of the consociational grand 
coalition than the Congress System, which was comprised of all Congress politicians. 
 
Measuring Political Instability  
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Empirical evidence from key political instability indicators, Crimes Against SCs and levels of 
rioting, demonstrates rising political instability, especially in more recent times when India has 
been the most consociational. 
 
 Figure 4.3: All-India Incidents of Rioting, 1953-2016 & Crimes Against SCs, 1 974-2016 
 
Sources: NCRB (1953-2016). Committee on the Welfare of the SCs & STs (1974-1992). 
Crimes against SCs have been steadily increasing since records began in 1974. The sharpest 
increase occurred between 1991-1994, a period which coincided with the Mandal Commission 
implementation. The introduction of reservations for OBCs intensified all caste identities and 
turned previously politically aligned marginalised groups into rivals. As SCs are at the bottom of 
the hierarchy, they are usually the victims of caste conflicts (often by OBCs). 
 
Levels of rioting have increased since independence, peaking between 1979-1990, before 
steadily declining in the 1990s. The decreases in rioting, despite growing consociationalism, can 
be explained by two key factors. In 1991 wide-ranging reforms liberalised the economy resulting 
in an unprecedented rise in income at the national level (Varshney, 2014:42). Where a divided 
state exhibits relatively low levels of economic development the likeliness of conflict remains 
high (Swenden, 2017: 246). India-specific analysis demonstrates a ‘1% increase in growth rate 
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and decreases the expected number of riots by over 5%’ (Bohlken & Sergenti, 2010:489). 
Furthermore, between 1998 and 2004 India was governed by the NDA, headed by the anti-
consociational BJP. The twin factors of an NDA government at the Centre and an upturn in 
economic development produced a short mitigating effect of the negative consequences of 
consociationalism.  
 
Fundamentally, the steady increases observed since the early 2000s demonstrate rising political 
instability, when India has been the most consociational with the accommodationist UPA 
government at the Centre, a high number of veto players, and expanded and greater enforced 
reservations. 
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The Rise of the Saffron Party 
Understanding the BJP 
 
To understand the meteoric rise of the BJP it is necessary to consider the space it occupies in 
Indian politics. The majority of literature fails to adequately analyse the BJP and its brand of 
Hindu Nationalism. Most work adopts an over-sensationalised, alarmist response before 
concluding the BJP poses a threat to the very fabric of the Indian state (Pai, 2014:16-19). This 
has detracted from a more holistic discussion of the party and its anti-consociational approach to 
governance. Whilst several troubling, well-documented factors associated with the BJP exist, 
particularly in its local manifestations espousing anti-Muslim sentiments, the party has 
consistently moderated since the mid-1990s to gain electoral support (Mitra, 2016:91). It is the 
BJP’s anti-consociational tendencies and transition to a moderate party that facilitated the BJP’s 
recent electoral successes.  
 
Hindu Nationalism, the BJP & Sangh Parivar 
The BJP is described as a Hindu nationalist party, yet Hindu nationalism is not a clearly defined 
movement or ideology but a broad and varying field of thought (Zavos, 2005:37). The focus on 
the divisive and destructive nature of Hindu nationalism overlooks the moderate anti-
consociational tendencies that exist within the BJP. Traditionally understood as a 
‘homogenisation-hegemony project’ seeking integration through a national identity based on 
Hindu culture (Palshikar, 2015:720), Hindu Nationalism aims ‘to get beyond social divisions’ 
and construct a nation based on a common culture (Jaffrelot, 2009:8), extending ‘beyond the 
discourse of communalism’ (Zavos, 2005:40). Hindutva (lit. ‘Hinduness’) is less a religious and 
more a cultural signifier with Hinduism ‘only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva’ 
(Savarkar 1989:3). The promotion of a common cultural identity allows the transcendence of 
ethnic identities. Thus it can be argued Hindutva is not about Hinduism but about ‘Indianess’. 
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However in extreme forms, there is slippage into ‘more clearly religious territory’ (Zavos, 
2005:45), which is dangerous for political stability and social harmony.  
 
The family of Hindutva organisations are collectively known as the Sangh Parivar. The most 
prominent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), is ‘the ideological and institutional 
keystone of Hindu nationalism’ (Varshney, 2014:38). When former BJS members broke away 
from the Janata party to form the BJP, it was characterised by a close alignment with the RSS. 
The reductionist approach of many scholars erroneously conflates the RSS and the BJP, 
overlooking their ‘complex and dynamic’ relationship (Palshikar, 2015:720). Fundamentally, the 
BJP is a political party, accountable to the electorate and tested during elections whereas the RSS 
remains outside democratic politics (Jaffrelot, 2009:191). Electoral compulsions forced the BJP 
to widen its appeal and abandon several anti-consociational policies still supported by the wider 
Sangh Parivar, such as opposition to reservations and linguistic federalism. Moreover, the BJP’s 
economic policies often conflict with the Swadeshi (self-reliance) ideals of the RSS (Desai, 
2005:256). 
 
A Moderate BJP 
Critics argue the BJP invokes the politics of communal polarisation and undoubtedly the Muslim-
Hindu cleavage remains important (Varshney, 2014:34). However, the party has progressively 
moderated, with many criticisms no longer holding up to scrutiny. It is this moderation that 
allowed the party to win in 2014. Some scholars point to the constraints of coalition governments 
and the Constitution for the BJP’s moderation4. Although these factors influenced the party, 
electoral incentives provide a more effective explanation.  
 
In the 1989 and 1991 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP adopted a miltitant Hindutva message and 
mobilisation strategy in an attempt to establish a single Hindu vote-bank. It reignited communal 
																																																								
4 Mitra (2016), Varshney (2014). 
	36 
agitations by evoking the controversial issue of building the Ram Temple at Ayodhya with party 
leader L.K. Advani’s Rath Yatra. The rationale was clearly anti-consociational: to convince 
OBCs their Hindu identity was more important than caste. Conflating Hindutva with religious 
sentiments increased the party’s support from devout Hindus (Palshikar, 2015:724) but its 
ideological positioning and mobilisation strategies created deep divisions within the Hindu 
community. A majority of the BJP’s support base, 67.5% of graduates, 66.2% of urban and 63.8% 
of upper-caste Hindus, believed the demolition of the Babri Mosque unjustifiable (Mitra & Singh, 
1999:145).   
Table 5.1. BJP Historical Support  
 
Source: ECI (1984-2014). 
 
As a result of Mandal, caste proved more significant for political mobilisation than religion. In 
response the party abandoned its opposition to reservations and BJP General Secretary K N 
Govindacharya, initiated a social engineering programme granting OBCs more space in the party. 
The BJP demographics were transformed with swathes of non-upper caste, non-RSS joining 
(Jaffrelot, 2000:105). In states like UP and Bihar, the leadership became dominated by OBCs. 
 
After losses in the 1993 Assembly elections, exhausting Hindutva issues and exploiting the 
support of upper-caste Hindus to saturation point proved insufficient to capture power at the 
Centre (Mitra, 2005:80), the BJP realised the limits of communal mobilisation. The impetus was 
confounded further when the BJP government collapsed after 13 days, as other parties refused to 
enter a coalition with a party perceived to be ‘extreme’. The adoption of party moderate Atal 
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Bihari Vajpayee as the Prime Ministerial candidate in the 1996 election marks the beginning of 
the transition to a moderate party (Pai, 1998:842). Under Vajpayee’s leadership the BJP projected 
itself as a ‘responsible’ national party, focusing on developmental issues (Pai, 2014:130). It 
moderated its Hindutva stance to become more inclusive: 
 
‘Hindutva is not to be understood or construed [as] narrowly confined to 
religious practices or expressed in extreme forms. It is related to the culture and 
ethos of the people […] giving equal treatment to all regardless of their personal 
faith is integral to this idea’ (BJP, 2009). 
 
The most sustained criticism against the BJP concerns its attitude towards minorities, which was 
valid during the early phase of the party and against many members today. However the 
experience of the previous NDA administration suggests a positive position on minorities. For 
example, there was 50% increase in Hajj subsidies and 50% increase in allocation of funds to 
improve Wakfs and Wafks boards (Mitra, 2005:80).  
 
The BJP & Consociationalism   
The BJP has always advocated against consociational policies, describing them as ‘minorityism’ 
(Varshney 1993:2520) and consistently rejects the consociational segregation-orientated 
approach to governance ‘an ideal society is not one that is compartmentalised into segments, but 
an integral whole’ (BJP, 1998).  Consociational policies are opposed as they promote ethnic 
identities and division rather than a national identity and unity.  
 
Hindu Nationalists support a strong Centre and conceive ‘federalism and linguistic states as 
conducive to divisive nationalism’ (Hansen & Jaffrelot, 1999:15). They support the 
establishment of 100 janapadas (administrative districts), dividing ‘linguistic zones and ensuring 
[…] they did not become mini-nations’ and limiting subnational powerbases (Jaffrelot 2009:99). 
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This rationale explains the previous NDA government’s creation of three new states for 
administrative rather than linguistic purposes. 
 
Concerning normative anti-consociational policy positions, the party maintains a continued 
commitment against separate personal laws by advocating a uniform civil code (BJP, 2014:44) 
and opposes the special status and autonomy afforded to Jammu and Kashmir by the Constitution 
(Jaffrelot, 2009:193). The BJP’s educational imperatives and the language adopted are anti-
consociational by promoting pride in ‘culture, heritage, and history’, with emphasis on ‘national 
integration, social cohesion, religious amity, national identity and patriotism’ (BJP, 2014:17). 
The BJP champions the use of Hindi as the national language, allowing linguistic barriers to be 
broken, facilitating nationwide communication and economic integration, and fostering trade 
between different regions. Economic integration is reflected in the BJP’s implementation of a 
common Goods and Services Tax (GST) to align states closer together.  
 
The party adopts an anti-consociational ‘non-essentialising’ approach to ethnic identities (Mitra, 
2005:80), empathising the shared interests between the majority and minorities and engaging 
with groups on concrete issues rather than identity politics. The BJP attempts to diminish the role 
of class and caste in politics ‘as such social categories are recognised as dividing India’ (Jaffrelot, 
2015:25). The party continually attempts to strengthen the ‘all India paradigm’ (Palshikar, 
2018:38), with phrases such as ‘One Nation, One People and One Culture’ (BJP, 1998). Caste 
cannot be transcended if there is institutional encouragement to keep caste identities alive, thus 
the BJP historically opposed reservations. Although the modern BJP accepts institutionalised 
quotas, the party often argued reservations should be based on economic criteria alone and thus 
open to all economically weaker sections of society’ (Jaffrelot, 2009:257). Modi, from an OBC 
caste, is generally perceived to oppose affirmative action programmes. As the son of a Chai 
wallah (tea-seller) to the Prime Minister, his life exemplifies success without reservations is 
possible. The anti-consociational platform and moderation of the party were instrumental for the 
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BJP’s recent electoral successes.  
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The 16th Lok Sabha Election: The Saffron Sweep 
 
The 16th Lok Sabah election in 2014 signified a fundamental change in Indian politics. The 
consociational approach that has dominated recent political history suffered a setback. The BJP 
recorded its most successful electoral performance, gaining support from previously unreachable 
regions and social groups. With 31% votes and 51.9% seats, it was the first time since 1984 that 
a single party secured a parliamentary majority. The election exposes the flawed consociational 
assumption of static and primordial identities and the BJPs successes can be understood as 
backlash against grand coalitions, identity politics and reservations. 
 
A speech delivered by Modi in 2013 in Delhi defined the themes of the election: development, 
good governance and anti-Congress sentiment (The Times of India, 2014) with Modi referencing 
his OBC background to appeal to lower-castes (Palshikar & Suri, 2014:43). The BJP presented 
its most moderate platform to date, concessions to Muslims were the highest in the party’s history 
and contentious Hindu-nationalist themes were scarce. 
 
The BJP increased its support across all states (except Punjab), castes, classes, and both urban 
and rural voters - with most gains between 10% and 20%. The party’s support was historically 
confined to upper-caste, urban, and middle-class voters whilst performing poorly with lower-
castes, Dalits, and religious minorities (Varshney, 2014:35). It successfully outperformed 
Congress in all social groups except Muslims. The BJP solidified its position with its traditional 
support bases whilst simultaneously attracting large numbers of OBCs, lower classes, and tribal 
voters.  It was the support of these groups that handed the BJP a decisive victory.  
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Table 5.2: 16th Lok Sabha Election Results of Major Parties
 
Source: ECI (2014). 
 
Figure 5.1: UPA & NDA Vote Share & Seats, 2009-2014  
Source: ECI (2010, 2014). 
Critics argue the BJP is only a party for North India and Hindi heartlands. Whilst the BJP secured 
67% of seats in the region, it made significant gains in areas previously unreachable. Adeney’s 
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(2015:11) analysis using the cumulative regional inequality score, enables the calculation of the 
regional-concentration of political parties. A score of 0 indicates perfect geographical spread and 
1 indicates complete geographical concentration (e.g., the AIDMK scores 0.93). The BJP and 
NDA receive scores of 0.15 and 0.26 respectively, whereas Congress and UPA score 0.24 and 
0.28.  Therefore, the BJP is more ‘national’ than Congress and its outreach greater than usually 
implied (Adeney, 2015:12).  Furthermore, since 2014 the BJP has swept to power in state 
legislatures throughout India, commanding power in all but the Southern and Eastern coastal 
states.  
 
Although the cumulative support of state parties marginally increased from 2009, a distinct 
change can be observed between regionalist and regionally-based parties. Regionalist parties that 
have strong ties to specific state, like the AIADMK, performed well. Conversely regionally-
based parties, which do not articulate a regional identity but represent caste and community in a 
concreted area like the SP and BSP, recorded decreases in support. In 2014, regionalist parties 
increased from 105 to 168 seats whilst regionally-based parties decreased from 107 to 46 
(Kailash, 2014:68). This is the sub-national manifestation of the shift away from 
consociationalism occurring at the national level. The regionalist parties promote a crosscutting 
regional identity, integrating segmental cleavages, whereas regionally-based parties that focus 
on narrow caste identities and promote reinforcing cleavages. The variation in support of regional 
parties undermines consociationalism, which predicts a stable vote share for these parties due to 
the primordial understanding of identity: electoral outcomes are determined by the demographics 
of ethnic groups who are expected to vote for their representative party. 
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Table 5.3: Changes in BJP Vote Share, 2009-2014 
 
Sources: ECI (2009, 2014), CSDS (2009, 2014) 
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The most important pillar of consociationalism, grand coalitions, played a decisive role in the 
BJP’s victory. The 2014 election was the most ‘presidential-style’ ever conducted; the BJP 
campaign focused around the ‘strong and decisive’ leadership of Modi. A CSDS (2014) poll 
suggests 27% of voters nationwide would have changed parties if Modi were not the prime 
ministerial candidate. This was in contrast in Congress, which had operated under the tripartite-
leadership of Manmohan Singh, Sonia Gandhi, and Rahul Gandhi during the previous 
government and suffered from corruption and policy paralysis fostered by coalitions. The 
contrast between the BJP and Congress was compounded further by the INC’s refusal to 
officially nominate a prime ministerial candidate during the election. 
 
The BJP successfully undermined the caste-based and state-specific consociational approach of 
previous general elections by setting aside state-level factors, making them less relevant. This 
argument is strengthened by the 2017 UP Vidhan Sabha election, where Modi’s message was not 
primarily about UP but his vision for all of India (Palshikar, 2018:37).  Modi criticised the role 
of caste in politics and contrasted this with his pan-Indian rhetoric. Consociational policies were 
countered by arguing ‘appeasement of one’ has been ‘at the cost of the other’ which has resulted 
in the proliferation of identity politics, tokenism, and clientelistic approaches, with the benefits 
for Dalits, OBCs, and Tribals unsatisfactory (BJP, 2014:10). 
 
The election demonstrated the fluidity of identity. An Indian identity developed and become 
more prevalent at the expense of a ‘caste-orientated sense of belonging’ (Jaffrelot, 2015:26). 
Palshikair and Yadav’s (2009:38) analysis the 15th Lok Sabha election has far greater significance 
after 2014: ‘the politics of social identity has hit a point of saturation, thus opening the possibility 
of other kinds of mobilisation’. To secure victory in many states, simple caste calculations were 
inadequate. The BJP successfully mobilised voters using a national identity, presenting a form 
of Hindutva at the election that diverged from traditional discourse, being reshaped by the 
concept of development, which combined material aspirations with identity concerns. The focus 
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on ‘national development’ allowed Modi to bypass issues of communal relations and minority 
rights (Palshikar, 2015:720) in congruence with the BJP’s ‘non-essentialising’ approach. The 
BJP’s anti-consociational platform sought to unite the population behind the ‘meta-narrative’ of 
development while other parties promoted the assertion of ethnic identities. The change in 
salience of different identities is inconceivable for consociationalists. 
 
The BJP’s successful mobilisation is highlighted by the increased voter turnout. Although the 
national turnout increased by 4.4% from 2009, in constituencies where turnout was over 15% the 
BJP had a win rate of 96% and constituencies with a 10%-15% increase the rate was still an 
impressive 86% (Sridharan, 2014:22-24). 
 
The shift in identities away from caste to the national left can partially be attributed to moribund 
OBC politics (Jaffrelot, 2015:27). In the Indira Sawhney v. Union of India case (1993), the 
Supreme Court ruled reservations not exceed 50% and in 2006 they were extended to higher-
level graduate education thus the maximum level is already operational. This is coupled with the 
states ‘disinvestment policies’ and a decreasing public sector. 
 
 Conclusion 
The resounding victory demonstrates the BJP has become a ‘catch-all’ party in social terms 
(Jaffrelot, 2015:34), signifies the pan-Indian rejection of consociationalism, and highlights the 
fluidity and multiplicity of identity. The saffron party’s ascendency represents a new anti-
consociational ideological framework and a ‘second dominant party system’ (Palshikar, 
2018:36). The electorate turned away from coalition governments, opting for strong and decisive 
leadership.  The BJP’s success is a demonstrable shift to a more unified Indian vote and receding 
importance of identity politics. The focus on development which the BJP presented in a ‘holistic, 
uniform and all pervasive’ (BJP, 2014:19) fashion enabled them to draw voters away from the 
regionally-based parties’ identity politics. Throughout the election it was evident that the concept 
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of development was intertwined with the use of Hindutva to promote an Indian identity thus 
superseding ethnic loyalties. Although caste remains an essential building block of micro-level 
politics, building a national coalition from these blocks has suffered a setback. 
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Case Study: Uttar Pradesh 2017 Vidhan Sabha Election 
 
Uttar Pradesh has been at the forefront of ‘social and political designs in Indian democracy’ and 
is the political ‘heartland’ of the nation (Kudaisya, 2002:163).  India’s most populous state 
weighs heavily on national politics, with its events often affecting all of India. The state, being 
an amalgamation of disparate regions artificially constructed by the British (Brass, 2015:64), 
lacks a distinct regional identity, meaning caste and religious cleavages are even more 
pronounced. 
 
The political history of UP, understood in four distinct phases, closely mirrors the country as a 
whole (Farooqui & Sridharan, 2017:17). The first phase is characterised by the Congress System, 
with the second phase relating to its decline and the rise of opposition parties. The third phase 
witnessed the rise and subsequent decline of Hindu nationalism and the BJP, coupled with the 
rise of backward and lower caste parties. The political transformations in the 1990s created the 
‘ethnification of the Party System’. The fourth phase of identity politics led to the rise and 
domination of caste-based parties - the BSP and SP (Chandra, 2005:236). Academic literature 
concerning UP politics reflects these developments and concentrates on four main areas of study: 
identity politics and the rise of marginalised castes, communal violence, Hindu nationalism, and 
patronage and clientelism in politics. 
 
An analysis of jati-level voting behaviour successfully refutes the primordial and static 
understanding of identity. Furthermore the consociational conception of homogenous ethnic 
groups (in India Dalits and OBCs for reservations) has facilitated more socio-economic and 
numerically dominant jati monopolising public employment and political office. Reservations, 
the proportionality pillar of consociationalism, institutionalised certain identities which 
reinforced allegiances to the elites of those groups, created the growth of identity parties, and 
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fractured the political system. The BJP successfully exploited these failing to win the Vidhan 
Sabha election. 
 
Party System 
UP exemplifies an ‘ethnic party system’ where political parties derive their support 
overwhelmingly from a particular ethnic group and serve their interests (Horowitz, 2000:291). 
Electoral winners in UP, like many states, are not won with programmatic merits, but through 
patronage politics and clientelistic strategies: overtures to specific communities with promises of 
jobs, infrastructure, cash, goods and access to government (Thachil & Teitelbaum, 2015:1047). 
Elections are perceived as a mechanism to make communal gains and prevent others taking away 
those already won (Heath & Michelutti, 2013:57). 
 
Consociationalism encourages the multiparty system that was fostered by reservations. The 
fractured system with four parties in contention for power enabled the SP and BSP to form 
majority governments with just 30% and 29% of the vote respectively in 2007 and 2012. High 
competition encourages parties to make narrow social appeals as a broad-based approach risks 
‘outbidding’ by other parties making more direct appeals to specific communities. Politicians use 
strong rhetoric to evoke jati identities, sharpening divisions, causes violence during elections and 
tensions between previously allied marginalised groups (Chibber & Nooruddin, 2004:152-187). 
The increased political conflicts over resources are often manifested locally in the form of social 
conflict and tensions between the main support bases of differing parties. The ability to form 
majority governments with a low vote share increases the stakes, heightening antagonisms.   
 
 
The BSP and SP 
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The SP, founded in 1991 by Mulayam Singh Yadav, developed from a broad-based, secular, 
socialist platform to a caste-based party representing the interests of Yadavs, the dominant OBC 
jati in UP (Pai, 2016). The SP was the main beneficiary from the Mandal mobilisation, rallying 
Yadavs and other supporters to dislodge anti-reservation forces. Following the Ayodhya incident, 
the SP presented itself as the defender of Muslims and gained their support.  The alliance enabled 
the SP to form majority governments in 2002 and 2012. 
 
The BSP, established in 1984 and led by Mayawati since 2003, consolidated its support among 
Dalits, especially Jatavs. The party uses strong rhetoric of fighting social injustices and 
championing Dalit interests. The BSP strengthened and shaped Dalit political identity, which 
also prevented the party from becoming more inclusive. The BSP formed a majority government 
in 2007 whilst Mayawati was Chief Minister on three previous occasions with support from other 
parties.  
 
Table 6.1: Vidhan Sabha Elections 1989 – 20175 
 
Source: ECI (1989-2017). 
 
 
 
The SP and BSP are ‘narrow ethnic parties’, deriving their core support from a single jati and 
suffer from a ‘hypercentralisation’ of power (Chhibber et al, 2014:503).  Demands are framed 
around social justice to uplift their support base at the expense of other groups (Heath & 																																																								
5 Highlighted cells denote the party of the Chief Minister(s).  
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Michelutti, 2013:56).  The BSP government was criticised for large, symbolic expenditures, 
particularly parks and statues, to glorify Dalits and their political assertion, whilst neglecting 
socio-economic issues (Michelutti & Heath, 2013:58). The party subverted public resources, 
concentrating spending on Dalit communities through programmes such as the ‘Ambedkar 
Village Scheme’ and other infrastructure projects (Heath & Michelutti, 2013:58). Mayawati 
implemented a ‘climate of fear’ in the bureaucracy, making the positions of Dalits unquestionable 
(Jaffrelot, 2003:416).  The BSP and SP greatly altered the demographic composition of the civil 
service and police, shaping it in favour of their own communities, which has facilitated 
lawlessness and corruption (Jaffrelot, 2003:416).   
 
The Mandalisation of Politics 
The mandalisation of politics resulted in the fragmentation of OBCs, establishing two further 
categories to the lexicon of reservation politics, Economically Backward Castes (EBCs) and 
Most Backward Castes (MBCs), as a reaction to the ‘creamy-layer’. Yadavs use their relative 
economic advantages to monopolise reservations and government positions, leaving other OBCs 
‘politically emaciated’ (Kang, 2016:17). Yadavs constitute 19% of OBCs yet occupy an 
estimated 33% of reservations. As a result, EBCs and MBCs follow their own development 
agenda by alternating between parties (Kang, 2016:16).  Likewise, exclusions within the SC 
category are ‘structurally similar’ to OBCs (Kumar, 2017:29). As reservation categories are 
conceived as homogenous, whereas the needs between jati differ, OBC and Dalit groups have 
fractured as jati agitate for greater, more specific reservations. 
 
 
Table 6.2:  Percentage (%) of Jati in OBC & SC Category and Percentage (%) in 
Reserved Jobs 
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Source: Verma (2001) 
 
Table 6.3: Estimated UP Demographics      
   Source: Verma (2001) 
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Figure 6.1: UP Incidents of Rioting & Crimes Against SCs , 1994 – 2016 
 
Source: NCRB (1994-2016). 
 
The antagonisms outlined above are empirically supported by the NCRB incidences of rioting 
and crimes committed against SCs in UP. Both riots and crimes against SCs were at their highest 
immediately following the implementation of Mandal and reached the lowest point in 2003. 
Significantly, the period of BSP and SP majority governments has created a steady rise in both 
instability indicators. The increases demonstrate that majority ‘ethnic party’ governance, created 
from Mandal and the proportionality pillar of consociationalism, has increased political 
instability. The caste-based politics in UP pitted the previously allied Yadavs and Jatavs against 
each other as they fight for resources, creating ‘the apogee of caste-based political mobilisation 
in the state’ (Farooqui & Sridharan, 2017:17). Reservations have increased levels of polarisation 
and caste antagonisms leading to the ‘atomisation of society’ (Tenhuen & Säävälä, 2012:40). 
 
Following Mandal, Dalits and OBCs cooperated as part of the ‘second democratic upsurge’ 
(Yadav, 1999:3293). However, since 1995, following an attack on Mayawati by SP members 
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after breaking their alliance, the BSP and SP have operated as political rivals, demonstrating that 
the cooperative claim by consociationalists is overestimated with only temporary incentives.   
 
2017 Vidhan Sabha Election 
The BJP entered continual decline in UP following Mandal and the demolition of the Babri 
Mosque. It became the party of urban upper-caste Hindus, with minimal outreach to lower-caste 
and rural communities. The trend reversed significantly in 2017 with the party converting its 
39.7% vote share into 312 seats (77%), representing a swing of 24.7% and a 265-seat increase. 
Conversely, the BSP, SP, and INC all recorded decreases in support of 3.7%, 7.1%, and 5.5% 
respectively.  
 
Table 6.4: Changes in Party Support Vidhan Sabha Elections, 2012-2017 
 
Source: ECI (2012, 2017). 
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  Table 6.5: C
hanges in Jati-level V
oting Behaviour V
idhan Sabha Elections, 2012-2017 
                       Source: CSD
S (2012, 2017). 
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The BJP’s election strategy was overwhelmingly successful; the party increased its support 
across all jati. The scale of victory can be attributed to non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Dalits, 
with swings of over 30% and 40%. Upper-caste Hindus returned to the BJP now they were a 
viable contender for power. The smallest swings came from Yadavs (0.8%), Jatavs (3.9%) and 
Muslims (2%) which all stayed with their traditional parties.  
 
BJP President Amit Shah coordinated the campaign and sharpened focus on these constituencies 
by portraying the BJP as a mechanism for development. Non-Yadav OBCs were 
disproportionally selected as BJP candidates and 65 tickets were granted to non-Jatav Dalits in 
reserved seats with the BJP winning in 68 out of 87 reserved seats (Verma, 2017). The BJP 
refused to nominate a Chief Ministerial candidate until after the election with ‘clinical 
organisation of all election-related activities’ focussed around Modi (Verma, 2016:90). 
 
The BSP and SP were continually criticised as ‘single-caste platforms’ by the BJP, building on 
non-Yadav OBC disenchantment with the SP and resentment of Yadav domination (Kang, 
2016:18). To win the support of non-Yadav OBCs, the BJP went against its anti-consociational 
approach by proposing to divide the 27% OBC reservation between EBCs, MBCs and OBCs , 
with 9% each (Kang, 2016:18). The social engineering formula can be observed in BJP election 
posters, which featured Modi, Shah and four state leaders, two from upper-castes and two from 
non-Yadav OBC castes.  
 
The defeat of the SP and BSP signifies a decline in identity-based politics and the diminishing 
effectiveness of caste mobilisations. The failings of reservations fragmented caste identity, as the 
BSP and SP are single-jati parties not representing marginalised groups as a whole. The agenda 
of good governance and development and its more inclusive conception of identity helped 
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supersede the politics of caste and community and aligned voters with a wider narrative than the 
fragmentation inherent in caste politics (Hasan, 2017).  
 
However, jati-identity politics continued to play a significant role in the BJP’s success. Confident 
of upper-caste support, the party engaged with social engineering. The BJP was able to exploit 
the discontent among the non-Yadav and non-Jatav populace, where the politics of 
consociationalism and social justice advocated by the BSP and SP had failed. The social justice 
agenda was subverted by broad-based identity politics and the BJP created a non-Yadav-non-
Jatav-Upper Caste coalition combined with development. 
 
Conclusion 
UP is the crucible of reservation politics. The manifestation of consociational proportionality has 
created political instability by increasing intergroup tensions. The SP and BSP both adopt 
strategies to increase the salience of jati and maintain segmental divisions to gain electoral 
support. Marginalised groups are now in frequent conflict over resources with the socio-
economically and numerically-dominant jati from each reservation category receiving a 
disproportionate share of resources and dominating political life. NCRB records of rioting and 
crimes against SC are a quantifiable demonstration of increasing political instability in UP. 
 
The concept of proportionality and identity politics are intertwined, with the former reinforcing 
the latter. Reservations have elevated the role of caste identity which has been exploited in UP’s 
recent history. However, the politics of reservations, which dominated the political agenda, has 
started to recede with 2017 representing the saturation point.  
 
The case study of UP falsifies the consociational conceptions of primordial or static identities 
and homogeneous segmental groups. The BJP was able to exploit the proportionality pillar of 
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consociationalism and theoretical flaw of segmental groups as homogenous. The party 
successfully capitalised on the discontentment with identity politics by large segments of OBCs 
and Dalits which ‘turn[ed] the politics of social justice on its head’ (Hasan, 2017).  The Dalit and 
OBC movements initially gave a voice for marginalised groups but have been reduced to 
reservation politics for specific jati in these groups, alienating other jati within the wider category 
and leaving non-Yadav OBCS and non-Jatav Dalits untouched by Mandal. Yadavs and Jatavs 
have become ‘interest groups with political instruments’ (Jaffrelot, 2015:31), focusing on 
identity, diluting ideology, and epitomising the criminalisation and clientelism of politics.  
 
UP demonstrates the complexity and fluidity of identities. As Pai states, ‘mandalisation has run 
its inevitable course’, creating an increased fragmentation within the OBCs (Pai 2016).  
Mobilising the non-Yadav OBCS and non-Jatav Dalits ‘blunted the politics of BSP and SP in 
one stroke’ and the BJP created a broader form of identity politics ‘on the ruins of the old political 
order which had outlived its utility for a critical mass of OBCs’ (Hasan, 2017).  
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Conclusion 
 
The impact of consociationalism in India has been twofold. Firstly, consociationalism increased 
antagonisms and caused rising political instability. Secondly, the increase in consociationalism 
in recent political history reached a saturation point in 2014 and enabled the BJP’s saffron sweep 
in both the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. Furthermore, India validates the false theoretical 
underpinnings of consociationalism. 
 
The literature review exposed the false assumptions: ethnic groups as homogenous, identities as 
primordial and static and the inexistence of crosscutting cleavages. The normative manifestations 
of segmental autonomy and proportionality, through policies of differential treatment, create 
antagonisms and conflict between ethnic groups. The prioritisation and institutionalisation of 
certain identities violates the rights of individuals, and groups not recognised in the 
consociational system. It does not account for groups being formed and reformed over time. 
These factors facilitated the development of the hypothesis, in accordance with critical rationalist 
theory: not only can consociationalism be falsified, consociational policies produce political 
instability, the very factor they are purported to mitigate.  
 
The first research question considered the impact of consociational policies on political 
instability in India. The historical analysis of Indian consociationalism demonstrated a number 
of consociational policies were adopted upon independence, which have increased dramatically 
in the 1990s through the introduction of OBC reservations and coalition governments at the 
Centre. Process-tracing of policies exposed the consociational approach to governance facilitated 
the omnipotence of caste, linguistic and religious mobilisations.  
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Grand coalitions, in the form of the NDA and UPA, became the norm at the Centre. The 
ideological gulf and competing interests between coalition partners made consensus near 
impossible. Minority groups made unreasonable demands and wielded a veto over all 
government policy. Corruption flourished with ministries treated as fiefdoms by state parties. 
Consequentially, grand coalitions and minority vetoes in India created dysfunctional and 
ineffectual governments by inserting policy paralysis into the decision-making process. The 
introduction of reservations for OBCs, which increased proportionality, increased caste 
antagonisms between marginalised groups in frequent conflict over resources. The political 
instability indicators, crimes against SCs, and riots, provided a quantitative demonstration of 
rising instability to support the historical analysis and process-tracing.  
 
Effectual understanding of the BJP and its place in Indian politics is essential to critically analyse 
the party’s recent saffron sweep of the political map. Undeniably the BJP suffers from anti-
Muslim sentiments, particularly at the lower levels of the party. However, the overt focus on the 
religious cleavage and the alarmist tones by many scholars overlooks the continued moderation 
of the BJP since its close alignment with the RSS and militant Hindutva message in the early-
1990s.  It was this moderation, which began with Vajpayee in the mid-1990s and was extended 
in 2014, which allowed the party to extend its outreach socially, linguistically and geographically 
to limits previously considered inconceivable. 
 
The second research question considered the extent to which the 16th Lok Sabha election and 
subsequent Vidhan Sabha elections can be understood as a consequence of consociational 
policies.  The BJP is the most anti-consociational party at the national level and its continual 
electoral victories represent the saturation point of consociational policies. In India’s most 
‘presidential’ election, the electorate rejected the grand coalition and tripartite leadership of the 
UPA and turned to Modi’s decisive leadership. The inclusive message of good governance and 
	 60 
development intertwined with Hindutva promotes an Indian identity that transcends identity 
politics and the cleavages of caste, language and region. In many respects the 16th Lok Sabha 
election marks the renationalisation of Indian politics. 
 
Electoral gains for the BJP have frequently been at the expense of identity parties. In a number 
of states the politics of reservations fractured the political system. The case study of UP 
demonstrates the domination of identity parties. The Yadav SP and Jatav BSP ensure unequal 
treatment and distribution of resources between jati as opposed to addressing the needs of Dalits 
and OBCs as a whole. The BJP exploited the consociational policy of reservations for electoral 
gain by recognising intra-group difference and rallying jati that have not benefitted from 
institutionalised quotas and are underrepresented in reservations. Thus, the decisive BJP victories 
can largely be attributed to the failings of consociationalism and the party’s ability to exploit 
those failings. 
 
The diversity of Indian states and the tendency of both Congress and the BJP to devise localised 
election strategies means drawing generalisations from a  single state is inadequate. Comparative 
studies between states with different political compositions and identities would help develop a 
more robust insight. For example, Gujarat operates a two-party system and has always been a 
BJP stronghold. Conversely, the state of Tamil Nadu with its strong regional identity has shunned 
national parties since 1967 and the BJP has yet to make inroads. Allowing for narrower scope 
would enable the relationship between reservation politics and the BJP’s ascendancy to be 
explored in greater detail. 
 
Although the BJP has been in government for four years, the party’s ascendency remains on-
going in state elections. Many political and policy changes take a number of years to be realised, 
therefore it is still too early to understand the long-term effects that the saffron sweep will have 
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on political stability and Indian politics more widely. The findings outlined in this thesis predict 
that if the BJP were to maintain an anti-consociational approach to governance, India would 
become increasingly politically stable. 
 
The conclusions have both theoretical implications for the consociational debate and normative 
implications for policy-making in India. Consociationalism not only provides an ineffectual set 
of policies for governance in heterogeneous states but also should be avoided to prevent further 
political instability. The opposing end of the spectrum concerning approaches to governance, 
integrationism, should be promoted as an effective form of managing stability.  
 
Policy implications suggest political parties that have broad-based support should form 
governments and not a grand coalition established through an ‘ethnic census’. Policies that 
strengthen segmental identities and reinforce cleavages should be avoided. In India this relates 
to reform or abolition of reservations and the realisation of Article 44 of the Constitution to adopt 
a uniform civil code. Institutionalised quotas in employment, political representation and 
segmental autonomy suffer from poor implementation, do not meet their intended goals and 
foster instability. Governments must adopt policies to promote crosscutting cleavages that enable 
ethnic divisions to be transcended.  
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